George Friedman, președinte Stratfor: „Nu ar trebui să supraestimăm puterea Rusiei”

Scris de **Admin** Joi Mai 29, 2014 5:43 am

Într-un interviu acordat EVZ, geostrategul american George Friedman, fondator și președinte al centrului de analize strategice Stratfor, vorbește despre criza ucraineană, planurile Rusiei în acest context și posibilele implicații la adresa securității României

EVZ: NATO a solicitat Moscovei o reuniune a Consiliului NATO-Rusia, săptămâna viitoare (n.red. aceasta), dar ruşii încă nu au răspuns. Secretarul General al Alianţei, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, este convins că Rusia este adânc implicată în destabilizarea situaţiei din Ucraina şi că Rusia nu şi-a retras trupele de la graniţa ucrainiană, deşi a afirmat acest lucru. Care credeţi că va fi răspunsul Rusiei şi ce şanse sunt ca această reuniune să soluţioneze actualele probleme dintre NATO şi Rusia?

George Friedman: Actuala criză dintre NATO şi Rusia nu este rezultatul vreunei neînţelegeri sau al lipsei de comunicare. Ea derivă dintr-o divergenţă a intereselor celor două tabere. Rusia are nevoie să menţină o zonă tampon între ea şi NATO, în timp ce Alianţa îşi doreşte o permeabilitate mai mare. Deşi sunt convins că fluxul de comunicare dintre Rusia şi NATO, respectiv dintre Rusia şi statele membre NATO, va continua, nu de întâlniri şi de comunicare ducem lipsă. Aşa că părerea mea este că, indiferent dacă această reuniune se va ţine sau nu, ea nu va schimba nimic substanţial în ceea ce priveşte relaţia NATO-Rusia.Săptămâna trecută (n.red. acum două săptămâni), preşedintele Rusiei, Vladimir Putin, a avertizat Uniunea Europeană cu privire la riscul închiderii conductelor de gaze pentru Ucraina dacă autorităţile de la Kiev nu-şi plătesc datoriile (3,508 miliarde USD). Credeţi că acesta poate fi un instrument eficient de presiune asupra Ucrainei şi aliaţilor ei europeni prin care să fi fost blocate alegerile din Ucraina, de pe 25 mai, sau prin care să nu mai fie adoptate noi sancţiuni la adresa Rusiei?

La acest moment al crizei, fiecare tabără stabileşte limitele viitoarelor lor acţiuni. Nu cred că rușii au urmărit să blocheze alegerile, deoarece calculul lor era că rezultatul acestora va creea suficientă tensiune la Kiev încât să genereze o stare de paralizie. De fapt, cred că ruşii au fost liniştiţi în privinţa susţinerii alegerilor. În ceea ce priveşte tăierea gazelor naturale, Moscova priveşte această posibilitate mai degrabă ca pe o ameninţare decât ca pe o realitate. Dacă într-adevăr vor face acest lucru, ruşii vor duce criza la un nou nivel, pe care nu şi-l doresc în acest moment.

Vladimir Putin a ordonat trupelor sale (40.000 de militari de lângă graniţa cu Ucraina) să se retragă în bazele militare, în încercarea de a opri escaladarea tensiunilor din regiune înaine de alegerile prezidenţiale. A mai spus acelaşi lucru şi înainte, dar Statele Unite şi NATO au anunţat că situaţia nu s-a schimbat cu nimic. Este aceasta doar o altă modalitate prin care Putin să mimeze că face ceea ce trebuie, pentru a nu mai fi acuzat de comunitatea internaţională, sau de data aceasta chiar are de gând să o facă? Ce se va întâmpla dacă trupele ruse rămân la frontiera estică a Ucrainei (în regiunile Rostov, Briansk şi Belgorod din sudul Rusiei), punând presiune pe oamenii care se tem de o posibilă invazie?

Întrebarea esenţială nu este unde se află trupele ruse, ci încotro se vor deplasa. În opinia mea, ruşii nu vor invada Ucraina pentru că mărimea acesteia o face dificil de ocupat, chiar şi cu resursele pe care le au la dispoziţie, astfel că au în vedere alte mijloace prin care să gestioneze evenimentele din Ucraina. Ruşii vor acţiona ca şi cum retragerea forţelor ar fi o chestiune majoră. Chiar dacă revin la bazele lor, se pot întoarce oricând înapoi. Unde se află este mai puţin important decât dacă vor invada sau nu, iar eu nu cred că o vor face.Unii dintre actualii sau foştii lideri europeni sunt buni prieteni cu Vladimir Putin (Gerhard Schroeder, Silvio Berlusconi, Marine Le Pen), iar aceştiarecomandă ca Rusia să nu fie izolată, în actualul context politic. Analiştii avertizează cu privire la posibilitatea unui alt Război Rece, iar unii dintre ei consideră că atitudinea Occidentului faţă de Moscova (declaraţii şi sancţiuni) este exagerată şi periculoasă. Credeţi că divergenţa de opinii din interiorul Uniunii Europene este un obstacol în calea atingerii unui punct de vedere comun pe baza căruia să se acţioneze în criza din Ucraina?

Este evident că Putin şi-a făcut aliaţi politici în Occident, dar cred că dinamica relaţiilor germano-ruse ar fi fost aceeaşi chiar dacă Putin nu ar fi cultivat prietenia cu Gerhard Schroeder. Au interese comune şi nici unii nici ceilalţi nu îşi doresc un alt Război Rece. Prin urmare, tind să privesc astfel de relaţii ca pe o simplă dimensiune a relaţiilor internaţionale, dar nu una esenţială. Istoria este influenţată, dar nu definită de acest tip de relaţii.

Rusia a avertizat că alegerile prezidenţiale din Ucraina pot agrava criza actuală, că pot adânci divizarea politică a ţării dacă nu se pune capăt ostilităţilor şi dacă nu este implementat un plan de încetare a crizei. Afirmaţiile ministrului adjunct de externe, Grigory Karasin, sunt cele mai recente semnale de la Moscova prin care se aruncă îndoiala asupra posibilităţii ca Rusia să accepte alegerile drept legitime. Cât contează poziția Rusiei în această privință?

Chestiunea nu este dacă Rusia va considera alegerile ca fiind legitime, ci dacă alegerile se soldează cu instalarea unui guvern funcţional în Ucraina. Dacă acest lucru se va întâmpla, atunci opţiunile Rusiei vor fi limitate. Dacă nu, atunci un guvern eşuat va constitui o oportunitate pentru promovarea intereselor ruse. Nu contează atât alegerile în sine, cât efectele concrete ale acestora.

Rusia pare hotărâtă să obțină cel puţin subiectul federalizării Ucrainei. Credeţi că aceasta ar însemna într-un final divizarea Ucrainei?

Multe state sunt federale, inclusiv Statele Unite. SUA s-au fragmentat în timpul RăzboiuluiCivil, dar au supravieţuit pentru că guvernul de la Washington şi-a putut impune autoritatea. Chestiunea federalismului se rezumă deci la posibilitatea Kievului de a-şi impune autoritatea. Dacă nu o poate face, atunci chestiunea federalismului nu are substanţă, căci Kievul nu are puterea pe care o presupune un astfel de concept. Dacă Kievul reuşeşte însă să îşi impună puterea, atunci federalismul este un instrument administrativ util. Pentru Rusia, problema nu este federalismul, ci dacă la Kiev se instalează un guvern eficient, pro-occidental. Acţiunile ruşilor vor fi definite de acest lucru.

Cât de probabil este, în opinia dumneavoastră, scenariul în care Rusia îşi extinde influenţa până la Dunăre, în speţă până la graniţele României, alimentând provocările în sudul Ucrainei?

Cred că este greu de imaginat acest scenariu. Rusia este mult mai slabă decât era Uniunea Sovietică atunci când s-a destrămat. Tocmai a pierdut Ucraina, care avea un preşedinte pro-rus, şi nu mai are influenţă decât în Crimeea şi câteva oraşe din est. Acest lucru este grav pentru neutralitatea ucraineană, un element fundamental al securităţii naţionale a Rusiei. Nu ar trebui să supraestimăm puterea Rusiei.

Per ansamblu, cum evaluaţi reacţia Occidentului la adresa agresiunii Rusiei în Ucraina? A existat vreo alternativă mai fermă la sancţiunile impuse? În acelaşi context, credeţi că vor fi adoptate sancţiunile economice împotriva Moscovei, având în vedere reticenţa unor state membre ale UE?

Occidentul trebuie privit nu ca întreg, ci prin prisma fiecărui stat naţional ce intră în această categorie. Cele mai multe astfel de state nu dispun de o putere militară semnificativă, aşa că reacţia lor nu poate decât să se rezume la declaraţii, care au o putere limitată. Statele Unite, care au la dispoziţie mai mult decât cuvinte, s-au arătat pregătite măcar să desfăşoare forţe minimale în regiune şi să înceapă un proces de întărire a unor ţări precum România. Vizita vice-preşedintelui Biden a constituit un moment hotărâtor în relaţiile româno-americane. La aceasta se adaugă şi vizitele în Polonia. Aşa că eu cred că reacţia din partea Europei s-a limitat la tot ceea ce a putut: la retorică. În schimb, din partea Statelor Unite au fost făcuţi nişte primi paşi cruciali.

Scris de **Admin** Joi Mai 29, 2014 5:46 am

American geostrategist George Friedman, founder and chairman of Stratfor, aglobal intelligence company, speaks to EVZ about the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s plans and possible implications for Romania’s national security

EVZ: NATO has asked Moscow to meet, next week, for a new reunion of the NATO-Russia Council, but the Russians have not given any answer yet. The secretary general of the Alliance, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, is convinced that Russia is deeply involved in destabilizing the situation in Ukraine and that, although they said it, Russia did not withdraw its soldiers from the Ukrainian border. What do you think will be Russia’s answer, and is there any chance that this new meeting could solve some of the present difficulties in their relationship?

George Friedman: The current crisis between NATO and Russia does not result from a misunderstanding or lack of communication. Its basis is in a divergence of interests. Russia needs to maintain a buffer zone between it and NATO. NATO wants greater permeability. While I am certain there will continue to be communication between NATO and Russia, and with NATO’s members, it is not meetings and communication that are missing. So my view is that whether this meeting takes place or not, it will not change anything substantial in the relationship.Last week, Russian president Vladimir Putin warned European Union regarding the risk of switching off the gas pipelines for Ukraine if Kiev is not paying the debts (3,508 billion dollars). Do you think this can be an efficient pressure instrument for Ukraine or for his European allies to stop the upcoming elections in 25th of May, in Ukraine, or not to impose new sanctions on Russia?

At this stage in the crisis, each side is establishing boundaries to what they will do. I think that the elections will not be stopped by the Russians because they calculate that the outcome of these elections will create sufficient tension in Kiev to cause paralysis. They actually are comfortable with holding them. As for cutting of natural gas, the Russians see this as more useful as a threat than a reality. If they make this a reality they push the crisis to new levels, which at the moment they don’t want.

Vladimir Putin ordered his troops (40.000 soldiers near the border of Ukraine) to withdraw in their military bases, trying not to increase the tensions in region before the presidential elections. He said that before, but U.S. and NATO announced there was not a single change in the situation. Is this another way in which Putin just mimes doing the right thing, so that he can not be blamedby the international community, or this time he really means it? What happens if Russian troops will remain at the Eastern border of Ukraine, (in southern Russian regions Rostov, Briansk şi Belgorod), putting pressure on people scared of a possible invasion?

The important question is not where the Russian troops are, but where they will go. In my opinion, the Russians will not invade Ukraine because its size is difficult to occupy even with available sources and they see other means for managing Ukrainian events. So the Russians will act as if withdrawing forces is a major issue. If they return to their bases, they can always leave their bases again. Where they are is less important than if they invade, and I don”t think they will.Some of the European ex or present leaders are good friends with Vladimir Putin (Gerhard Schroeder, Silvio Berlusconi, Marine Le Pen) and they recommend not to isolate Russia, in the actual political context. Analysts warn of another possible Cold War, and some of them consider Western attitudes towards Moscow (statements and sanctions) to be exaggerated and dangerous. Do you see different opinions in the European Union as an obstacle in reaching a common point of view for acting in the Ukrainian crisis?

Obviously Putin has cultivated political allies in the West. But I think if he hadn’t cultivated Gerhard Schroeder the dynamics between Germany and Russia would be the same. They have interests in common and neither wants another Cold War. Therefore I tend to see relationships as a dimension of international relationships but not at their core. History is influenced but not defined by such relation.

Russia warns that presidential elections in Ukraine may aggravate the present crisis, they will deepen political divisions in the country if there is no end to hostilities and a "road map" to end the crisis is not implemented. Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin’s remarks are the latest from Moscow to cast doubt on whether Russia will consider the election legitimate. What could happen if Kremlin does not recognize the results or if the Eastern regions do not take part in the presidential vote?

The issue is not whether Russia regards the election as legitimate, but whether a functioning government emerges from the election. If it does, then Russia’s options will be limited. If it doesn’t, then a failed government opens the door for Russian interests. It is not the election but what comes out of it that matters.

Russia appears determined to at least get to the point of Ukraine’s federalization. Do you believe this literally translates into the division of Ukraine in the end?

There are many countries that are federal, including the United States. The United States fragmented during its civil war but survived because the government in Washington could assert its power. The issue of federalism is whether Kiev can assert its power. If it cannot, then the issue of federalism is meaningless. Kiev’s power is not there. If that power does extend, the federalism is a useful administrative tool. For Russia, the issue is not federalism, but whether a pro-western, effective government emerges in Kiev. Their actions will be defined by that.

How likely is, in your opinion, the scenario in which Russia expands its influence all the way to Danube, namely to the Romanian borders, by stoking provocations in southern Ukraine as well?

I think that this is difficult to imagine. Russia is much weaker than the Soviet Union was when it fragmented. It has just lost the Ukraine which had a pro-Russian President and holds only Crimea and some cities in the Far East. It is bad for a fundamental element of Russia’s national security, Ukrainian neutrality. We should not overrate Russian power.

How do you assess the West’s overall response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine? Was there any firmer alternative to the staged sanctions? In the same context, do you think economic sanctions will be adopted against Moscow amid some EU member states’ reticence?

The West must be divided into its component nation-states. Most of these nation-states lack significant military power so whatever their response, it was in words, which have limited power. The United States, which has more than words, has shown itself prepared to at least deploy some minimal forces and to begin the process of strengthening countries like Romania. Vice President Biden’s visit was a turning point in US-Romanian relations, and visits to Poland have also taken place. So I think the response from Europe has been all that is possible, rhetoric. From the United States there have been first and crucial steps.

Scris de **Admin** Joi Mai 29, 2014 5:48 am

Președinte și fondator al centrului de analize strategice Stratfor, înființat în 1996
Născut în 1949 la Budapesta, Ungaria, într-o familie de evrei supraviețuitori ai Holocaustului
Licențiat în științe politice la City University din New York, luându-și apoi doctoratul la Univesitatea Cornell
Înainte de a fonda Stratfor, a predat timp de aproape 20 de ani științe politice la Universitatea Dickinson din orașul Carlisle, statul Pennsylvania
Specialist în politică externă americană, geopolitică globală, relații internaționale, analiză de informații strategice, strategii de război
autor al mai multor cărți de geostrategie, precum „Următorul Deceniu”, „Următorii 100 de ani”, „ Războiul Secret al Americii” și „Viitorul Războiului”, multe publicate în 20 de limbi
A publicat numeroase articole de specialitate în mari publicații internaționale, precum Time, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Newsweek, Financial Times și a comentat evenimente internaționale pentru CNN și CNBC
A furnizat expertiză armatei americane și altor agenții guvernamentale și a ținut prelegeri la importante școli și academii militare din Statele Unite
Căsătorit, tată a patru copii

Scris de **Admin** Joi Mai 29, 2014 3:53 pm

Western propaganda about events in Ukraine has two main purposes. One is to cover up, or to distract from, Washington’s role in overthrowing the elected democratic government of Ukraine. The other is to demonize Russia.

The truth is known, but truth is not a part of the Western TV and print media. The intercepted telephone call between US Assistant Secretary ofState Victoria Nuland and the US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt reveals the two coup plotters discussing which of Washington’s stooges will beinstalled as Washington’s person in the new puppet government.The intercepted telephone call between Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and EU foreign policy official Catherine Ashton revealed suspicions, later confirmed by independent reports, that the sniper fire that killed people on both sides of the Kiev protests came from the Washington-backed side of the conflict.

To summarize, when Washington orchestrated in 2004 the “Orange Revolution” and the revolution failed to deliver Ukraine into Western hands, Washington, according to Victoria Nuland, poured $5 billion into Ukraine over the next ten years. The money

went to politicians, whom Washington groomed, and to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that operate as educational, pro-democracy, and human rights groups, but in fact are Washington’s fifth columns.

When President Yanukovych, after considering the costs and benefits, rejected the invitation for Ukraine to join the European Union, Washington sent its well-funded NGOs into action. Protests broke out in Kiev demanding that Yanukovych change his decision and join the EU.

These protests were peaceful, but soon ultra-nationalists and neo-nazis appeared and introduced violence into the protests. The protest demands changed from “join the EU” to “overthrow Yanukovych and his government.”

Political chaos ensued. Washington installed a puppet government, which Washington represented as a democratic force against corruption.

Areas of southern and eastern Ukraine are former Russian territories added to Ukraine by Soviet leaders. Lenin added Russian areas to Ukraine in early years of the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev added Crimea in 1954. The people in these Russian areas, alarmed by the destruction of Soviet war memorials commemorating the Red Army’s liberation of Ukraine from Hitler, by the banning of Russian as an official language, and by physical assaults on Russian-speaking people in Ukraine broke out in protests. Crimea voted its independence and requested reunification with Russia, and so have the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Washington, its EU puppets, and the Western media have denied that the votes in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk are sincere and spontaneous. Instead, Washington alleges that the protests leading to the votes and the votes themselves were orchestrated by the Russian government with the use of bribes, threats, and coercion. Crimea was said to be a case of Russian invasion and annexation.

These are blatant lies, and the foreign observers of the elections know it, but they have no voice in the Western media, which is a Ministry of Propaganda for Washington. Even the once proud BBC lies for Washington.

Washington has succeeded in controlling the explanation of the “Ukrainian crisis.” The unified peoples in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk have been branded “terrorists.” In contrast, the Ukrainian neo-nazis have been elevated to membership in the “democratic coalition.” Even more amazing, the neo-nazis are being described in the Western media as “liberators” of the protest regions from “terrorists.” Most likely, the Russophobic neo-nazi militias are becoming Washington’s stooge government’s army, because so many units of the Ukrainian military have been unwilling to fire on peaceful protesters.

The question before us is how will Russia’s leader, President Putin, play this game. His hesitancy or reluctance to accept Donetsk and Luhansk again as part of Russia is used by the Western media to make him look weak and intimidated. Within Russia, this will be used against Putin by Washington-funded NGOs and by Russian nationalists.

Putin understands this, but Putin also understands that Washington wants him to confirm their demonized portrait of him. If Putin accepts requests from Donetsk and Luhansk to return to Russia, Washington will repeat its allegation that Russia invaded and annexed. Most likely, Putin is not weak and intimidated, but for good reasons, Putin does not want to give Washington more propaganda to employ in Europe.

Washington’s press for sanctions against Russia has an obstacle in Germany. The German Chancellor, Merkel, is Washington’s vassal, but Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier and German industry are no friends of sanctions. In addition to Germany’s dependence on natural gas from Russia, thousands of German companies are doing business in Russia, and the employment of several hundred thousands of Germans is dependent on economic relations with Russia. Former German chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Gerhard Schroeder have slammed Merkel for her subservience to Washington. Merkel’s position is weak, because she has put herself in the position of sacrificing the interests of Germany to Washington’s interests.

Putin, who has demonstrated that he is not the typical dumb Western politician, sees in the conflict between Washington’s pressure on Germany and Germany’s real interests a chance to break up NATO and the EU. If Germany decides, as Yanukovych did, that Germany’s interests lie in its economic relations with Russia, not in being a puppet state of Washington, can Washington overthrow the government of Germany and install a more reliable puppet?

Perhaps Germany has had enough of Washington. Still occupied by Washington’s troops 69 years after the end of World War II, Germany has had its educational practices, its history, its foreign policy, and its membership in the EU and euro

mechanism coerced by Washington. If Germans have any national pride – and as a very recently unified people, they might still have some national pride – these impositions by Washington are too much to accept.

The last thing Germany wants is a confrontation, economic or military, with Russia. Germany’s vice chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel, said that it “was certainly not smart to create the impression in Ukraine that it had to decide between Russia and the EU.”

If the Russian government decides that Washington’s control of Ukraine, or whatever part remains after secession, is an unacceptable strategic threat to Russia, the Russian military will seize Ukraine, historically part of Russia. If Russia occupies Ukraine, there is nothing Washington can do but resort to nuclear war. NATO countries, with their own existence at stake, will not agree to this option.

Putin can take the Ukraine back whenever he wants and turn his back on the West, a declining corrupt entity mired in depression and looting by the capitalist class. The 21st century belongs to the East, to China and India. The enormous expanse of Russia sits above both of these most populous of all countries.

Russia can rise to power with the East. There is no reason for Russia to beg the West for acceptance. The basis for US foreign policy are the Brzezinski and Wolfowitz doctrines, which state that Washington mustprevent the rise of Russia. Washington has no good will toward Russia and will hamper Russia at every opportunity.

As long as Washington controls Europe, Russia has no prospects of being a part of the West, unless Russia becomes Washington’s puppet state, like Germany, Britain, and France.

zic și YO, ca tăt omu

YO CU TINE, TU CU MINE ,SUS OPINCA , SUS ROMÂNE !!!

Scris de Continut sponsorizat

George Friedman, președinte Stratfor: „Nu ar trebui să supraestimăm puterea Rusiei”

George Friedman, președinte Stratfor: „Nu ar trebui să supraestimăm puterea Rusiei”

Interviul original în limba engleză

CARTE DE VIZITĂ GEORGE FRIEDMAN președinte Stratfor

Putin sees chance to break up NATO, EU: Analyst

Re: George Friedman, președinte Stratfor: „Nu ar trebui să supraestimăm puterea Rusiei”